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Abstract 
 
While  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  has  been  largely  in-
spired  by  the  successive  experiences  of  enlargement,  it  has  also 
been  designed  partly  not  to  replicate  exactly  enlargement  ap-
proaches. Key differences include the existence of unresolved con-
flicts in the EU neighbourhood and the development of European 
security provisions since 1999, parallel to the traditional economic 
instruments of cooperation.  This paper attempts to assess what les-
sons can be learnt from the ENP early experience regarding its im-
pact  on  conflict  resolution.  It  examines  negotiations  of  EU  eco-
nomic  support  and  peace-building  efforts  with  South  Caucasus 
countries and Moldova and builds upon these case studies to draw 
general lessons on the influence of the EU as an international actor. 
The article concludes that EU commitments in promoting conflict 
prevention partly fall short when they have to be implemented, due 
to the lack of coherence among Member States, while EU impact is 
real when main policy-makers and implementers are Europeanised 
in their working methods, and when EU member states agree to 
delegate their foreign policy to the EU. 
 
Keywords:   ENP, Eastern neighbourhood, EU capabilities, crisis 
management, South Caucasus 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Conflict prevention stands as one of EU key external priorities, as 
shown by the firm commitment taken by the EU to set clear politi-
cal priorities for preventive actions, improve EU’s early warning, 
enhance the EU’s instruments for long and short term prevention 
and build effective international partnerships in this field
1. These 
objectives stated by the Göteborg programme for the prevention of 
violent conflicts adopted in 2001 under the Swedish presidency of 
late Anna Lindh still guide and frame the three EU institutions en-
gagement in foreign affairs.  
 
To  ensure  sustainable  economic  growth  and  development  world-
wide, including in its neighbourhood, the EU needs to support and 
help  maintaining  peace  and  security.  Similarly,  EU  support  to 
growth and development is supposed to be conducive to long-term 
peace
2. We assume that this interrelation between economic support 
and peace-building is relevant in the cases of enlargement and of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
 
This paper attempts to assess what lessons can be learnt from the 
ENP early experience regarding its impact on conflict resolution. It 
first looks at similarities and differences between enlargement and 
the  ENP.  Negotiations  of  EU’s  economic  support  and  peace-
building efforts with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are then exam-
ined to contribute to the debates on the influence of the EU as an in-
ternational actor. 
 
 
2.  Enlargement and Neighbourhood: two faces / instruments 
of the EU’s external action 
 
Enlargement and neighbourhood are two different components of 
the EU’s external action.  
                                                 
1 EU programme for the prevention of violent conflicts, 2001. 
2 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the 
Member  States  meeting  within  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consen-
sus’, published in the Official Journal C/46 from 24.02.2006. 104  European Political Economy Review  
   
It is being argued in this volume that neighbourhood policies, to 
some extent, have been largely inspired by the successive experi-
ences of enlargement. This point is certainly true but it also means 
that neighbourhood policies have been designed partly not to repli-
cate exactly enlargement approaches. This is what we would like to 
explore in this section.  
 
First of all, enlargement, despite the variety of acceding members, 
is very much expected to be a one-size-fits all approach. It has de-
veloped in a post WWII context and focused on economic growth 
and reconstruction. It is clearly not the case of the ENP. The ENP is 
a common approach for a set of very different kinds of policies sup-
posed to address heterogeneous contexts all affected by globalisa-
tion and, in the case of the Eastern neighbourhood, by the fall of 
communist regimes and frozen conflicts. Enlargement responds to a 
political vision while neighbourhood policies are tools used to ad-
dress political uncertainty. This article therefore uses the singular 
for enlargement and the plural for neighbourhood policies.  
 
While  the  success  of  enlargement  policies  largely  depends  on 
timely fulfilment of already agreed criteria (the acquis), neighbour-
hood policies are officially supposed to rely upon EU neighbours’ 
ownership of self-defined reforms. ENP is therefore supposed to be 
a demand-driven
3 process where recipient ownership is a primary 
factor for success. As it was conceived, enlargement is both about 
joint  ownership  and  the  transformation  of  a  “relation  between 
neighbours” into a “sharing the same housing space” state of play, 
as an ultimate goal. The ENP is much less clear about its objectives 
since membership is not granted.  
 
Enlargement  policies  have  been  a  very  specific  foreign  policy 
(Smith 1999) that has vocation to develop and die. As stated by 
numerous policy-makers, neighbourhood policies is a “ni-ni” op-
tion: neither in nor out. It is like an “entre deux” policy that has the 
                                                 
3 CEPS Report of Event, EU support to civil society in the Eastern Neighbour-
hood,  remarks  by  Hilde  Hardemann,  Head  of  Unit,  Moldova,  Belarus  and 
Ukraine, DG Relex, European Commission, 28 March 2006. Helly: EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood  105 
weakness of partnership relations without the strength of the carrots 
offered by enlargement
4.  
 
The pattern of negotiations of ENP action plans may have varied 
over time as negotiation for accession partnerships did. For example 
the first seven ones were but little negotiated and looked quite simi-
lar while Commission’s benchmarks started to be diluted after ne-
gotiations with Egypt
5. However the fact is that ENP’s rationale 
remains unclear as far as future membership of Eastern European 
countries is concerned.  
 
Post Cold War enlargements had to deal with security concerns and 
conflict risks with the support of NATO and WEU at a time when 
the EU had not yet developed its security competences. Tensions 
between  central  European  countries  on  sovereignty  (the  Czech-
Slovak partition), minority disputes (Hungarian minorities in Ro-
mania) and spill-over of Balkans conflicts have been dealt with by 
frameworks outside the EU such as the Stability Pact, the Weimar 
triangle or the Visegrád group. Since 1999, the face of European se-
curity has dramatically evolved and the EU is now both in charge of 
negotiating partnerships and contributing to provide stability on the 
continent.  
 
The tensions induced by these new internal links existing between 
the  economic  dimension  of  enlargement  and  the  development  of 
European security provisions are particularly acute in the case of 
conflict resolution in former Soviet Union
6. While conflict preven-
tion encompasses explicit early warning and peace-building activi-
ties as well as indirect contributions to peace like development co-
operation conflict resolution is more usually applied to the case of 
Eastern European so-called “frozen” conflicts that remain unsolved 
since the end of the cold war.  
 
                                                 
4 "La  politique  de  nouveau  voisinage  n’a  pas  pour  objectif  l’élargissement  de 
l’UE  ;  elle  ne  l’implique  pas,  mais  ne  l’exclut  pas  non  plus",  Javier  Solana, 
interviewed by Caucaz.com, 2 November 2005. 
5 I thank Elsa Tulmets for this remark.  
6  On  conflict  prevention,  see  Evans  2006.  On  conflict  resolution  in  the 
neighbourhood, see Coppieters et al. 2004.  106  European Political Economy Review  
   
In the framework of the ENP, the EU has to deal with unsolved con-
flicts that may resurge at any time. Enlargement to Central Europe 
did not have to face similar situations (apart from Cyprus) where 
conflicts had already occurred and above mentioned mechanisms, 
together with EU accession, all contributed to prevent violent solu-
tions.  
 
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, TACIS and then the ENP have so far 
addressed conflicts partly with the same old economic instruments 
of  co-operation  and  technical  assistance  that  were  used  in  the 
framework of enlargement
7. It can therefore be said that TACIS and 
the  ENPI  are  to  a  limited  extent  the  successors  of  Phare  pro-
grammes.  
 
In this frame specific measures have though been taken to specifi-
cally tackle conflict and post-conflicts challenges, such as rehabili-
tation and reconstruction programmes, assistance to Internally Dis-
placed People (in Azerbaijan and Georgia/Abkhazia/South Ossetia), 
and activities to assist third countries in the field of border security 
management (Georgia and Moldova). The EUROJUST THEMIS, a 
mission launched and managed by the Council’s General Secretariat 
in  the  field  of  criminal  law  in  2004  was  supposed  to  assist  the 
Georgian Government in drafting a national strategy for criminal 
law. It was set up as a preventative tool in order to support the new 
leadership’s  reforms  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Rose  Revolution. 
Themis was nonetheless more of a test-case for Rule of Law mis-
sions under the second  pillar than an explicit conflict prevention 
policy in the country
8. 
 
Notwithstanding efforts made to assist conflict resolution through 
economic and technical assistance the ENP still suffers from miss-
ing links to play a central role in conflict resolution processes in its 
neighbourhood: while it has a security dimension and provides a vi-
sion to prevent conflicts (Cameron, Balfour 2006), it lacks of a se-
curity  arm to actually  help solving them (which is a problem of 
ownership, resources/capacities and political will - for the EU itself, 
                                                 
7 For an example of the use of technical co-operation in the field of transportation 
to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the mid-1990s, see Helly 2001.  
8 For a more detailed evaluation of the mission, see Helly 2006.  Helly: EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood  107 
as elaborated later in this paper) (Popescu 2005). Although improv-
ing security is an objective of the ENP, there is still a lot of room to 
improve and strengthen the ways it could develop and implement its 
security components (Lynch 2005). This reflects the delays to be 
expected between policy Commission’s policy statements and im-
plementation
9.  
 
In practice, the ENP will be managed according to the principle of 
differentiation,  even  in  the  case  of  regional  approaches.  Because 
priorities are defined jointly with third countries, differentiated ap-
proaches have already had to be applied to negotiate action plans in 
all neighbouring countries. This has created a precedent that will in-
fluence the way policies will be implemented in each country. Na-
tional contexts and governments in the neighbourhood, varying ex-
pectations and objectives will shape the content and the future of 
EU-neighbourhood dialogues and relations in varying countries.  
As Javier Solana puts it,  
 
“Not every country is equal, not every country moves at the 
same speed, but in general terms if we can do it together that 
will be better” (Solana 2006) 
 
It is thus to be expected that the ENP will increasingly become a 
puzzle composed of very heterogeneous pieces as differences in tra-
jectories in Southern Caucasus have already started to demonstrate 
despite the EU’s regional approach (Solana 2006). The ENP as such 
is a framework and the content of the relationship will be defined by 
evolving interactions, negotiations and reciprocal perceptions.  
 
Apart from conflict resolution, ENP economic and trade dimensions 
seem to replicate enlargement policies that had made a bet on the 
virtues of functionalism
10. By extending its infrastructure networks, 
trade preferences and standards to its neighbourhood, the EU ap-
pears to be trying, as it has done with enlargement policies, to foster 
                                                 
9 Popescu (2005) quotes a Commission document (EC 2004: 24) stating that the 
EU cannot confine itself to economic and political spheres.  
10 “The economic effects of wider Europe”, CEPS discussion, early 2001. 108  European Political Economy Review  
   
political change via structural, long-term and functional change
11. 
The day-to-day work at low level in organisations and administra-
tions may very well be similar in candidate and neighbouring coun-
tries. However, how successful this work is will be determined by 
the level of commitment in partner governments. Because of ENP 
lack of clear incentive (like EU accession) to implement genuine re-
forms, efforts made under the neighbourhood policy may result in 
lack of political back-up from top level leaderships in neighbouring 
countries.  
 
Ultimately, in conflict-affected countries, ENP governance and se-
curity dimensions promise to be the most difficult to implement
12 
and one of the reasons why is because they often cause conflicts as 
much  as  (if  not  more  than)  economic  factors.  In  Moldova  and 
Transdniestria, weak, ill-equipped and corrupt customs and border 
guards structures together with conservative and soviet-style intelli-
gence services, by maintaining a status quo, have prevented con-
structive efforts from the OSCE or the EU to achieve any encourag-
ing result in the resolution of the conflict
13.  
 
In Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili has brought to powers young fal-
cons who don’t have much respect from Human Rights and who 
have fostered resurgence of conflict in South Ossetia just one year 
after coming to power
14.  
 
                                                 
11 A report of International Crisis Group of 2006 quotes an EU diplomat saying 
that the EU should use its experience acquired in Central and Eastern Europe (In-
ternational Crisis Group 2006: 11).  
12  For  a  short  overview  of  security  sector  reforms  stakes  in  the  Eastern 
neighbourhood, see Hanggi, Tanner 2005.  
13 Research carried by the author in Moldova and Transdniestria, April 2005 and 
August 2004. Moldovan and Transdniestrian intelligence services use rough and 
counter-productive propaganda methods to discredit each other, thus worsening 
tensions between the two sides of the Dniestr. On customs and border guards see 
also Crisis Group Draft Report on Moldova/Transdniestria, in possession of the 
author, August 2006. The report confirms that smuggling is going on through the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border despite the presence of the EU Border Assistance 
Mission.  
14 See various 2004 and 2005 International Crisis Group’s reports and briefings 
on the conflict in South Ossetia. Accessible on: www.crisisgroup.org  Helly: EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood  109 
For some in the NGO community, ENP action plans were a good 
opportunity for the EU to remind its neighbours that they should 
comply to those basic human rights practices they adopted while en-
tering the Council of Europe
15.  
 
While EU’s capabilities in the neighbourhood consist of ENP assis-
tance (with the security gaps identified above), expectations have 
been managed by the EU in such a way that it created ambiguities 
vis-à-vis future accession possibilities. For some neighbouring (in 
particular Eastern ones) countries, accession may still be possible 
one day but it is not granted. For the most motivated countries who 
still firmly believe in their EU destiny this ambiguity may become 
an incentive to make full use of EU capabilities in accordance with 
their own ambitious expectations. This may be the case of Ukraine 
or Moldova whose EU’s future has remained possible but much less 
obvious for the three South Caucasian countries.  
Such a virtual circle may result in an increased EU influence on its 
neighbourhood provided all favourable factors are in place.  
 
 
3.  Factors  of  EU  influence:  lessons  learnt  to  inform 
neighbourhood policies
16 
 
Understanding  the  EU’s  external  action  requires  a  systemic  ap-
proach that includes all EU institutions and member states, non state 
actors and EU’s direct interlocutors in third countries (Easton 1964, 
1965; Ginsberg 2001; Helly 2003).  
 
Several  general  lessons  regarding  EU’s  influence  can  be  drawn 
from the cases of Southern Caucasus and Moldova. First, EU’s in-
fluence is strong when the main policy-makers, implementers and 
agenda-setters have become Europeanised
17 in their working meth-
                                                 
15 Human Rights Watch briefings on ENP Action plans in the Caucasus. Accessi-
ble on: www.hrw.org  
16 This  general  section  is  also  available  from  a  book  by  GCSP  and  Chatham 
House 2006 and are elaborated in Helly 2003.  
17 Europeanisation here is understood as a process along which actors, as policy 
entrepreneurs, might they represent a member state, an EU institution or a non 
state organisation, have increasingly recourse to EU policy references, justifica-
tions, allies, resources and practices to achieve their objectives. Europeanisation 110  European Political Economy Review  
   
ods  and  have  played  the  role  of  genuine  political  entrepreneurs. 
Second, bottom-up lesson learning from the field to the capitals and 
to  Brussels  has  increased  levels  of  both  field-informed  and  EU 
knowledge among EU staff. Third, EU impact is real and positive 
when Member States accept that they will not veto EU-centred ini-
tiatives, and are prepared to delegate their foreign policy to the EU 
flag. Fourth, the EU’s added value exists when it is mirrored by 
genuine interest from third parties. When this combination of fac-
tors is reached, the so-called political dwarf’s soft power appears 
sometimes more efficient and influential than a giant’s hard power. 
 
However, when these factors are absent, EU’s influence is rather 
weak and hampered by several key variables. When member states’ 
policies are only made in European capitals and are under the influ-
ence of individuals who appear to be mesmerised by the value of 
national diplomacies; and when these policy makers are unaware of, 
or not properly trained to evaluate and acknowledge national for-
eign policies’ limits on the ground, there is barely room for the ef-
fective influence of the EU. When this happens, it seems that the 
Commission then  has  to  try  to  manage  ‘non-decision’  situations, 
which  in  turn  means  that  it  loses  credibility  because  of  its  own 
structural weaknesses. These weaknesses include a high staff turn-
over, a lack of a genuine institutional memory, in-fighting between 
departments  within  the  Commission,  and  counter-productive  cul-
tural, economic and political implicit messages.
18 The Commission 
can  also  face  a  lack  of  commitments  from  third  parties,  and  of 
course exogenous factors (regional or other global players that are 
more influential in the EU in a given country) do play a role and 
limit EU’s influence.  
 
As far as conflict resolution in the Eastern European Neighbour-
hood is concerned, case studies may help to understand how and 
why the EU exerts its influence as an international actor.  
                                                                                                               
has been discussed at length by academics and engendered endless debates on its 
definition and scope of application in the EU political system (internally and ex-
ternally). The one offered here does not pretend to be affiliated to any particular 
school. 
18 A large literature is available on implicit messages and the lack of (conflict) 
sensitivity,  much  of  which  is  discussed  on  the  Berghof  Centre’s  website: 
http://www.berghof-center.org/english.htm   Helly: EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood  111 
4.  Action  plans  negotiations  and  implementation:  lessons 
learnt for the EU as an international actor 
 
4.1  The  EU  is  an  influential  international  actor  in  its  Eastern 
neighbourhood by creating high expectations 
 
As many have already noted neighbourhood policy is to a very large 
degree a domestic reform process, highly dependent on local ca-
pacities and political will. However, the pace of reforms is itself 
interlinked with the availability of appropriate EU tools, resources 
and support.  
 
The recent and short experience of ENP in Moldova and Ukraine 
(i.e. the negotiation phase of action plans and the first year of their 
implementation in some countries) shows that the EU is an influen-
tial international actor in its neighbourhood despite the lack of con-
vincing sticks or carrots.  
 
Following  the  failure  of  the  Russian-supported  Kozak  Memoran-
dum to solve the conflict on Transdniestria Moldova has opted for a 
pro-European stance. President Voronin changed political colours 
and with his reformed Communist party he has become one of the 
most  fervent  Europeanised  Eastern  leaders.  The  Council  and  the 
Commission have acted in coherence in Moldova by issuing visa 
ban against key figures of the Transdniestrian elite and by finding 
technical and inter-institutional arrangements to launch the BAM 
(Border Management Mission) along the Transdniestrian-Ukrainian 
border. The presence of EU Special Representatives, whose teams 
were  sometimes  composed  of  staff  coming  either  from  Member 
States’  Foreign  Ministries  (in  Georgia)  or  Commission’s  delega-
tions
19, certainly has provided Brussels with a thorough understand-
ing  of  local  contexts  and  players.  Even  when  fully  EU-oriented 
leaders from Neighbourhood countries like in Georgia or Moldova 
do their best to implement their action plans, they ultimately remain 
dependent on how the EU machinery delivers assistance (Popescu 
forthcoming).  
                                                 
19 In Moldova, the political affairs officer of the EC Delegation in Kiev was ap-
pointed in Chisinau to assist the EUSR. This example of cross-pillar staff mobil-
ity illustrates how field expertise can benefit the EU system of external action. 112  European Political Economy Review  
   
The Commission in particular remains extremely powerful in the 
way it set priorities for ENP Action plans. Cyprus, as an EU mem-
ber, withheld EU negotiations with Azerbaijan on the basis of the 
fact that Baku was willing to pursue ties with the Northern Cyprus
20. 
In March 2006 Georgia was still hoping but in vain for a shift in the 
EU’s draft action plan towards strong engagement in conflict reso-
lution while the EU’s original draft didn’t go beyond a reference to 
its  readiness  to  assist  with  post-conflict  rehabilitation  (RFE/RL 
2006a).  
 
The Georgian experience has shown that despite consultation with 
civil society and clear priorities set by the Government, joint own-
ership is in the end the result of a negotiation where the EU is the 
strongest player, partly because it cannot afford to be very flexible  
Although ENP implementation will vary from one country to an-
other,  it  also  remains  a  template  approach,  legally  defined  by  a 
Communication  and  several  other  policy  documents  (Council’s 
conclusions, reports). Commission’s officials therefore remain con-
strained by a mandate and limited resources and time. Since peace 
and security issues ultimately fall under Council’s field of compe-
tences, conflict resolution will be problematic until the new consti-
tutional  arrangements  in  2008  clarify  future  EU’s  outreach,  as 
agreed at the last EU Council in June 2006.  
 
4.2  The EU remains weak in conflict resolution mainly because 
of Member States’ choice  
 
The  ENP  created  frustration  on  third  parties  when  it  has  not 
matched their expectations. Moldovan and Georgian representatives 
have expressed such discontent in Spring 2006 and it remains to be 
seen  if  EU  rigidity  will  have  counter-productive  effects  on  its 
neighbours  motivation  for  reforms  in  the  long  term.  While 
Moldova’s Prime Minister stated that EU membership is its coun-
try’s “firm intention” Ursula Plassnik, the Austrian Foreign Minis-
                                                 
20 “EU officials say Azerbaijan has only allowed one commercial flight to take 
place in violation of the policy of isolation followed by the EU with regard to 
Northern Cyprus, but refuses to commit itself unequivocally to ruling out any fur-
ther flights”. www.eurasianet.org  Helly: EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood  113 
ter, underlined that Moldova must “manage its expectations in a re-
sponsible way” (RFE/RL (2006b).  
 
Mismatch between the EU and neighbours expectations are often 
linked to two factors: neighbourhood and ownership (Heinrich Böll 
Foundation
 2004). The EU is often viewed by small neighbours as 
an opportunity to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis their (some-
times too intrusive) border countries. This is certainly the case for 
Moldova and Georgia regarding Russia
21. Despite Moldovan and 
Georgian attempts to receive more explicit support in their struggle 
with Moscow, the EU as a whole, mostly because of lack of consen-
sus amongst its Member States, remains cautious not to upset Rus-
sia too much.  
 
Viktor Yushchenko, Mikhail Saakashvili and Vladimir Voronin all 
have first clearly stated that EU Membership was a top priority for 
their countries, reflecting their high expectations vis-à-vis Western 
European powers and the EU. In these cases, the EU (some of its 
big member states in particular France and Germany ) has been in-
fluential enough to resist Eastern neighbours’ requests as well as in-
ternal pressures from more supportive new Eastern members such 
as Poland or Estonia. Whether this has to be seen as a weakness or 
strength, it is left to the reader’s judgement. 
 
In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, France has repeatedly rejected the 
idea to cede its co-chair seat to the EU in the OCSE Minsk Group in 
charge of negotiating a settlement
22. Such move, with a French be-
ing appointed as co-chair anyway, would certainly have strength-
ened the EU’s weight on the negotiation without decreasing Paris’ 
diplomatic  profile.  Another  example  of  Member  states’  veto-like 
position is Abkhazia where Germany, France and the UK could de-
cide to speak with one voice on behalf of the EU in the framework 
of  the  Group  of  Friends  of  Georgia.  Instead,  a  second  informal 
Group of friends was created by new or to-be member states (Po-
land, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria) to counter-
balance  pro-Russian  trend  in  the  first  Group  of  Friends  (Socor 
2005).  
                                                 
21 Even though Russia and Moldova don’t have any common border. 
22 More details on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its context: ICG (2005 a,b).  114  European Political Economy Review  
   
4.3  EU’s influence still relies a lot upon third parties’ ownership 
of reforms 
 
The ENP implementation very much looks like a learning process 
for neighbourhood countries in their relations with the EU. A lot 
still has to become usual business and there is a long way to go be-
fore reaching a routine level in EU’s relations with its neighbours
23. 
First months of enthusiasm in accession have followed by more re-
alistic statements and attitudes. As some analysts wrote in the case 
of South Caucasus, “Decision-makers in Baku and Tbilisi are in-
creasingly sceptical about their chances for membership, and their 
interest in strengthening ties to Brussels is beginning to cool” (In-
ternational  Crisis  Group  2006).  At  the  end  of  the  day  accession 
prospects for neighbourhood countries will become clearer if pro-
gress made in internal reform is obvious. Strong efforts in the field 
of corruption, security sector reform, democratisation and economic 
legislative framework will remain key benchmarks against which 
countries’ motivation to join the EU will be assessed. In the short 
term, disappointment from EU’ lack of engagement in conflict reso-
lution  may  result  in  disillusioned  ownership  followed  by  lack  of 
progress and a stagnation in EU-Eastern neighbours relations. Such 
an option would confirm that mere EU economic support with stan-
dardised criteria along the enlargement approach without sufficient 
incentives may not be enough to build-up long-term stability and 
Europeanisation in the Eastern neighbourhood. In the long run de-
veloping more conflict or security-related policies to match expecta-
tions in the field of conflict resolution may help the EU to assert it-
self as an international actor in its Eastern Neighbourhood. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has first compared enlargement and ENP approaches. It 
then provided a rapid overview of lessons learnt on the conditions 
                                                 
23 Nicu Popescu reported that Ukrainian and Moldovan first ENP implementation 
reports  in  Ukraine  and  Moldova  were  far  too  long  and  not  focused  enough. 
(Popescu forthcoming, paper initially presented on 11 March 2006 in Yerevan, 
Armenia, at the STARLINK conference on “Security, Transparency, Account-
ability  and  Reform:  Linking  the  Security  Sectors  of  Georgia,  Moldova  and 
Ukraine to the European Mainstream”).  Helly: EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood  115 
for EU influence before looking at how they apply in the case of 
EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and conflict resolution.  
 
EU commitments in promoting conflict prevention and developed in 
the 2001 Göteborg programme partly fall short when they have to 
be implemented and applied to frozen conflicts and their resolution 
in its Eastern neighbourhood
24. This clearly illustrates a lack of co-
herence  mainly  due  to  lack  of  political  will  from  or  agreement 
amongst some Member States regarding the EU’s role but also to a 
structural situation where security components of EU’s foreign pol-
icy  are still being developed. Some improvements were made in 
Moldova and Georgia with assistance in border security and advice 
on criminal law but these are still embryonic initiatives. 
 
Despite  these  missing  links  and  delays  that  create  frustrations  in 
third countries as well as inside the EU, some EU influence is still 
exerted  through  the  creation  of  high  expectations  vis-à-vis  eco-
nomic and trade elements of the ENP. This means that the EU poli-
cies can  reach influence without necessarily being fully coherent 
and comprehensive in their implementation. Ultimately more secu-
rity/conflict  resolution  engagement  by  the  EU  in  its  Eastern 
Neighbourhood will probably strengthen its existing impact so far 
obtained, for example, through assistance programmes in the field 
of rehabilitation or confidence-building. Deeper engagement in the 
security sphere will help deepen the relation with countries as long 
as their expectations remain high and as their leaderships are genu-
inely committed to implement locally-owned reforms.  
 
While a large amount of ENP instruments used in the framework of 
technical assistance and co-operation can be seen as a prolongation 
of enlargement policies, a new European security component is in 
the making. This implies new arrangements to be found amongst 
EU institutions and Member states and that will certainly evolve 
over time with the revival of the Constitution project in the years to 
come.  
 
                                                 
24 The EU Border Assistance Monitoring between Ukraine and Moldova might be 
an exception but its impact still needs to be properly assessed. 116  European Political Economy Review  
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